Empathy in Bimatrix Games by Powers, Brian et al.
Empathy in Bimatrix Games
Brian Powers, Michalis Smyrnakis and Hamidou Tembine∗†
August 8, 2017
Abstract
Although the definition of what empathetic preferences exactly are
is still evolving, there is a general consensus in the psychology, science
and engineering communities that the evolution toward players’ behav-
iors in interactive decision-making problems will be accompanied by the
exploitation of their empathy, sympathy, compassion, antipathy, spiteful-
ness, selfishness, altruism, and self-abnegating states in the payoffs. In
this article, we study one-shot bimatrix games from a psychological game
theory viewpoint. A new empathetic payoff model is calculated to fit em-
pirical observations and both pure and mixed equilibria are investigated.
For a realized empathy structure, the bimatrix game is categorized among
four generic class of games. Number of interesting results are derived. A
notable level of involvement can be observed in the empathetic one-shot
game compared the non-empathetic one and this holds even for games
with dominated strategies. Partial altruism can help in breaking symme-
try, in reducing payoff-inequality and in selecting social welfare and more
efficient outcomes. By contrast, partial spite and self-abnegating may
worsen payoff equity. Empathetic evolutionary game dynamics are intro-
duced to capture the resulting empathetic evolutionarily stable strategies
under wide range of revision protocols including Brown-von Neumann-
Nash, Smith, imitation, replicator, and hybrid dynamics. Finally, mutual
support and Berge solution are investigated and their connection with
empathetic preferences are established. We show that pure altruism is
logically inconsistent, only by balancing it with some partial selfishness
does it create a consistent psychology.
1 Introduction
We consider two players. Let N = {1, 2} be the set of players. Each player
i has a set of actions Ai. The non-empathetic reward functions of player i is
ri :
∏
iAi → R. We consider empathetic preferences. Players have preferences
on the joint strategy outcomes. The outcome of player i choosing action ai ∈ Ai
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combines her intrinsic preference for ai ∈ Ai with the intrinsic preference of i’s
neighbors, Ni, where the weight given to the preference of any neighbor j ∈ Ni
depends on the strength of the directed relationship between i and j. A basic
setup and for illustration purpose this is modeled with the number λij . By a
self-regarding player we refer to a player in the game who optimizes her own-
payoff (without empathy for others). A self-regarding player thus cares about
the behavior that impact her own payoff. This is scaled with a number λii. The
sign of λii plays an important role as it determines if it is a maximization or
minimization of own-payoff. An other-regarding player considers not only her
own payoff but also some of her network members’ payoffs. Then, the other-
regarding player will include these in her preferences and create an empathetic
payoff. She is still acting to maximize her new empathetic payoff. Based on these
basic empathy structures, we construct an empathetic payoff as a combination
of payoffs through a matrix Λ = (λij)i,j . In contrast to most of existing studies
in this field, we include not only positive value of λij (referred to as partial
altruism) but also negative value of λij (referred to as partial spite). The instant
empathetic payoff of i is
rΛi := λiiri +
∑
j∈Ni
λijrj ,
where rIi := ri denotes the initial non-empathetic payoff of player i. Based
on the material payoffs, a player can have empathy/malice for the others and
selfishness/selflessness for herself.
Selfish
λij = 0 &
λii > 0
Partially
Spiteful
λij < 0
Partially
Altruistic
λij > 0
Figure 1: Behavior of i towards j for different sign values of λij .
The empathetic payoff rΛi can be interpreted as follows.
• Selfishness: Selfishness is being concerned for oneself or one’s own payoff,
regardless of others’ payoffs. It is the lack of consideration for other play-
ers’ payoffs. If λij = 0 we say that i is not empathetic towards j. Player
i is self-regarding if λij = 0 for all j 6= i. If all the λij are zeros for every
(i, j) then, every player focuses on her own-payoff functions positively or
negatively depending on the sign of λii. The case of λii > 0 corresponds
to the partial selfishness. The case of λii < 0 is seen as a self-abnegating
behavior (see Figure 2).
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Figure 2: Behavior of i towards herself for different sign values of λii.
• Partial Altruism: If λij > 0 we say that i is partially altruistic towards
j. If all the λij are positive for every i, j, every player is considering the
other players in her decision in a partially altruistic way.
• Partial Spite: If λij < 0 we say that i is partially spiteful towards j. If
all the λij are negative for every i, j every player is considering the other
players in her decision in a partially spiteful way (Figure 1).
• Mixed altruism-spitefulness-neutrality: The same player i may have differ-
ent empathetic behaviors towards her neighbors. For example, if λij > 0,
λik < 0 and λil = 0 for j, k, l ∈ Ni then player i is partially altruistic
towards j, partially spiteful towards k and neutral towards l.
1.1 Related work
In the 1880s, [1, pages 102-104] introduced the idea of other-regarding payoff
transformations as follows: player i maximizes the payoff function Ri(ai, aj) =
λri + (1 − λ)rj where λ ∈ (0, 1). Here λ and 1 − λ represent relative weights
that i assigns to ri (own) and rj(to the other player’s) non-empathetic payoff,
respectively. The work in [2] proposed an interesting model of partial altruism
as an explanation for the results of public good contribution games, where a
player’s utility is a linear function of both the player’s own monetary payoff and
the other players’ payoffs. The work in [3, 4] proposed a model that uses both
spite and altruism, where the adjusted utility of a player reflects the player’s
own utility and his regard for other players. A model of fairness is proposed
in [5] where in addition to purely selfish players, there are players who dislike
inequitable outcomes.
1.2 Contribution
In this paper we examine one-shot 2× 2 bimatrix games with empathetic pref-
erences. Our contribution can be summarized as follows. Filling the gap in
empathetic games analysis literature, this article presents empathy from pos-
itive, negative or neutral perspective behind the limited focus on altruism or
3
malice. With a clear classification of the game, a better understanding of the
overall structure of empathetic outcomes as well as the learning techniques to
evolutionarily stable equilibria are presented. We show that the altruism en-
forces Nash equilibrium payoff equity and improves fairness between the players.
In contrast, spite may worsen the payoff inequality gap. The results reveal that
the dominated strategies of the classical bimatrix games are not necessarily
dominated any more when users’ psychology is involved, and a significant level
of involvement can be observed among the decision-makers who are positively
partially empathetic. Empathy can help in stabilizing to equilibria. Pure altru-
ism is logically inconsistent, only by balancing it with some partial selfishness
does it create a consistent psychology.
1.3 Structure
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the empa-
thy structure in games with two players and two actions per player. Section 3.1
focuses on empathetic evolutionary game dynamics and connection to evolution-
arily stable strategies. Section 3.2 presents the impact of empathy in generic
learning algorithms. Section 4 establishes connection between mutual support,
positive empathy altruism and Berge solution concept. Section 5 examines in-
consistency of empathy structure in a multi-level hierarchical reasoning. Section
6 concludes the paper.
2 Empathy in 2× 2 Games
We consider two players, each having two actions. Let Ai = {1, 2} be action
set and A := ∏iAi be action profiles space of all players. The selfish payoff of
player i is denoted by ri : A → R. By slightly abusing the notation we will write
ri(a) for the reward player i gains if the joint action a ∈ A is played. Given
a 2 × 2 matrix Λ with entries denoting the empathy of the players and vector
r(a) =
(
r1(a)
r2(a)
)
, a simplified structure for the empathy reward function,
rΛ(a), is given by Λ.r(a). Therefore, the rewards of the two players will be
(λ11r1 + λ12r2 and λ22r2 + λ21r1) respectively. The empathetic game then, is
given by:
GΛ := {{1, 2}, {1, 2}2, rΛ1 , rΛ2 }.
Table 1 represents a generic form of an empathetic game. It is easy to see
that if Λ = I is the identity matrix, i.e. a diagonal matrix with λii = 1, one
obtains the no-empathy game with a generic form as it depicted in Table 2. We
are interested in the structure of equilibria of the empathetic game GΛ for all
possible range of the coefficient of the matrix Λ.
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Player I
Left Right
Player II
Up (λ11a11 + λ12b11, λ22b11 + λ21a11) (λ11a12 + λ12b12, λ22b12 + λ21a12)
Down (λ11a21 + λ12b21, λ22b21 + λ21a21) (λ11a22 + λ12b22, λ22b22 + λ21a22)
Table 1: GΛ :Payoff matrix with Empathy
Player I
Left Right
Player II
Up (a11, b11) (a12, b12)
Down (a21, b21) (a22, b22)
Table 2: GI : Payoff matrix without empathy.
2.1 Solution Concepts
We briefly refer to few solution concepts. A Nash equilibrium [6] is a situation
in which no player can improve her payoff by unilateral deviation. A Pareto
efficient, or Pareto optimal, is a joint action profile in which it is not possible to
make any one player better off without making at least one player worse off. An
evolutionarily stable strategy is a Nash equilibrium which is resilient by small
proportion of deviants (also called mutants).
2.2 Classification of Generic 2× 2 One-Shot Games
By suitably choosing the entries of matrix Λ the resulting empathetic game of
any 2 × 2 game will fall in one of the following categories, independently of
the rewards’ structure of the initial game. These categories include the trivial
cases of constant payoff games or games with weakly dominated actions. In
addition they can be classified as coordination (such as Bach-or-Stravinski),
anticoordination (such as Hawk-or-Dove), discoordination (such as matching
pennies) or games with a dominant strategy (such as Prisoner’s dilemma). Below
we present some existing results for these games in terms of stable or unstable
equilibria and limit cycles or oscillations which might occur. In addition vector
field plots are used in order to present the evolutionary game dynamics of such
games [7].
2.2.1 Outcomes of coordination games
The canonical example of this class of games is the Bach or Stravinski game or
the rendez-vous game. In the generic setting the following inequalities in payoffs
hold for Player 1 (rows): a11 > a21, a22 > a12 and for Player 2 (columns): b11 >
b12, b22 > b21. In this game the strategy profiles {Up,Left} and {Down,Right}
are pure Nash equilibria. This game has two pure strategy Nash equilibria,
one where both chose the first action and another where both chose the second
action. There is also a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. Figure 3 depicts a
typical vector field of coordination games. As it is illustrated in Figure 3, unlike
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Figure 3: Outcomes of coordination games. The two pure Nash equilibria (0, 0)
and (1, 1) are also evolutionarily stable strategies. The mixed Nash equilibrium
is not an evolutionarily stable strategy.
the pure Nash equilibria, the mixed equilibrium is not an evolutionarily stable
strategy. Additionally, the mixed Nash equilibrium is also Pareto dominated by
the two pure Nash equilibria. As illustrated in the vector field, the two pure
equilibria are stable and the the fully mixed equilibrium is unstable in the sense
of Lyapunov.
2.2.2 Outcomes of anti-coordination games
Anti-coordination games have the same properties as coordinations if we change
the names of the strategies for Player 2. In this class of games it is mutually
beneficial for the players to play different strategies. An example of a anti-
coordination games is the so-called Hawk and Dove games, or snowdrift game
or game of chicken. The payoffs of the players in an anti-coordination have the
following properties: a21 > a11, a12 > a22 and b12 > b11, b21 > b22 for row-
player and column-player respectively. The pure action profiles {Down,Left}
and {Up,Right} are the two pure Nash equilibria. There is also a unique mixed
strategies Nash equilibrium. Figure 4 plots a typical vector field of an anti-
coordination game. As illustrated in the vector field, the two pure equilibria are
stable and the the fully mixed equilibrium is unstable in the sense of Lyapunov.
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Figure 4: Outcomes of anti-coordination games. Two pure equilibria and one
fully mixed equilibrium
2.2.3 Outcomes of empathetic prisoner’s dilemma games
A Prisoner’s Dilemma game is a 2 × 2 game where each player has a strictly
dominant strategy, where the rewards of the players are of the form a21 >
a11 > a22 > a12. The outcome where both players choose their dominated
strategy strongly Pareto-dominates the outcome where both players choose their
dominant strategy. This belongs to the class of games with a dominant strategy.
Figure 5 plots a typical vector field of prisoner’s dilemma games. We observe
a global convergence to the unique evolutionarily stable strategy under various
evolutionary game dynamics.
2.2.4 Outcomes of empathetic matching pennies games
In Table 2, choosing payoffs so that a11 > a21, a22 > a12 while b11 < b12, b21 >
b22, creates a discoordination game. In each of the four possible action profiles
either Player 1 or Player 2 are better off by switching their strategy, so the only
Nash equilibrium is a fully mixed one. One such an example of game is the
“so-called” matching pennies game, which is played between two players, 1 and
2. Each player has a penny and must secretly turn the penny to heads or tails.
The players then reveal their choices simultaneously. If the pennies match (both
heads or both tails), then Player 1 keeps both pennies, so wins one from Player
2 (+1 for Player 1, -1 for Player 2). If the pennies do not match (one heads
and one tails) Player 2 keeps both pennies, so receives one from Player 1 (-1 for
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Figure 5: Outcomes of prisoner’s dilemma games. All interior trajectories con-
verges to the unique ESS (0, 0) at the corner.
Player 1, +1 for Player 2). There is no pair of pure strategies such that neither
player would want to switch if told what the other would do. Instead, the unique
Nash equilibrium of this game is in mixed strategies: each player chooses heads
or tails with equal probability. Figure 6 plots a typical vector field of a typical
zero-sum matching pennies game. The dynamics need not converge even if the
equilibrium point is the unique equilibrium point of the game.
3 Effect of empathy on one-shot game’s out-
come
In this section various effects of empathy in the games which belong to the
categories referred in the previous section are studied. A strategy is dominated
for a player if she has another strategy that performs at least as good no matter
what other players choose.
The next result shows that dominated strategies of the game without empa-
thy can survive in the empathetic game.
Proposition 1. A dominated strategy in GI is not necessarily dominated in
the game GΛ for Λ 6= I.
This is a very important as it allows the survival of dominated strategies
when empathy is involved.
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Figure 6: Outcomes of empathetic matching pennies games. Non-convergence
to the unique mixed strategy equilibrium. Convergence to a limit cycle for
Λ = I.
Proof. It suffices to prove it for the empathetic prisoner’s dilemma game. Let
Λ =
(
1 λ12
λ21 1
)
,
with λij ≥ 0, i 6= j and a21 > a11 > a22 > a12 and bij = aji. The inequalities
a21 > a11 and a22 > a12 imply that it is better for Player 1 to choose action
2 independently of the other player. Similarly, the inequalities b12 > b11 and
b22 > b21 imply that it is better for Player 2 to choose action 2 independently of
the other player. Then action 1 is dominated by action 2 in the non-empathetic
game. Now, we check these inequalities in the empathetic game. For Player 1:
aΛ11 := λ11a11 + λ12b11 = a11(1 + λ12) is greater than a
Λ
21 := λ11a21 + λ12b21 =
a21 +λ12a12 as long as a11−a21 +λ12(a11−a12) > 0 and this is possible because
a11− a12 > 0 by assumption. It suffices to consider λ12 > a21−a11a11−a12 > 0 and then
action 1 is not dominated by action 2 of Player 1 in the empathetic game.
For Player 2: bΛ11 := λ22b11 + λ21a11 = (1 + λ21)a11, and b
Λ
12 := λ22b12 +
λ21a12 = a21 + λ21a12. It follows that a11 − a21 + λ21(a11 − a12) > 0 if λ21 >
a21−a11
a11−a12 . For λ12 and λ21 such that
min(λ21, λ12) >
a21 − a11
a11 − a12 > 0,
the first action is not dominated any more in the empathetic game. In the
resulting empathetic game the action profile (1, 1) is a pure Nash equilibrium
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that is Pareto-dominant. We conclude that action 1, which is a dominated
strategy in GI , is not necessarily dominated in the game GΛ for Λ 6= I.
Proposition 2. GI is symmetric does not imply that GΛ is symmetric. In
particular GΛ helps in breaking symmetry through empathy.
Proof. The game GI is said symmetric if the matrix A and B are square matrices
and B is the transpose of A. In empathetic games different players may have
different empathy structure i 6= j, λij 6= λji, and the matrix entries bΛ12 =
λ22b12 + λ21a12 may be different than a
Λ
21 := λ11a21 + λ12b21 even if b12 =
a21, b21 = a12. Hence the empathy structure can break the symmetry in the
game.
Proposition 3. Altruism and self-confirming can help in selecting social wel-
fare.
This result is very important in the sense that it allows the possibility for
the social welfare to be selected by means of design of the empathy structure.
Note, however, that for some other empathy structure the outcome may strictly
worsen the social welfare.
Proof. Consider again the symmetric prisoner’s dilemma satisfying a21 > a11 >
a22 > a12 and bij = aji. The empathetic version of the game selects the social
welfare action profile (1, 1) for
min(λ21, λ12) >
a21 − a11
a11 − a12 > 0.
Proposition 4. Altruism can help in reducing payoff-inequality. Spite can
worsen payoff equity.
Proof. The payoff gap is
rΛ1 − rΛ2 = λ11r1 + λ12r2 − λ22r2 − λ21r1
= (λ11 − λ21)r1 + (λ12 − λ22)r2.
For Λ =
(
1 µ
µ 1
)
, the payoff gap yields rΛ1 − rΛ2 = (1 − µ)(r1 − r2). This
proves both announced results depending on the magnitude of µ.
Let Λ =
(
1 λ12
λ21 1
)
, λ˜ = λ12λ21 and a, b denote the rewards of Player 1 and
2 respectively for a specific joint action. Then the following proposition holds:
Proposition 5. • If a > b and b > 0 then payoff inequality is reduced if
λ˜ < ab and payoff inequality is increased if λ˜ >
a
b
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• If a > b and b < 0 then payoff inequality is reduced if λ˜ > ab and payoff
inequality is increased if λ˜ < ab
• If a < b and b > 0 then payoff inequality is reduced if λ˜ < ba and payoff
inequality is increased if λ˜ > ba
• If a > b and b < 0 then payoff inequality is reduced if λ˜ > ba and payoff
inequality is increased if λ˜ < ba
Proof. We will show the proof for the first statement since the rest can be
derived using an identical process. The difference between the rewards of the
empathetic game and the strategic form game are:
a+ λ12b− b− λ21a < a− b⇔ λ12b < λ21a⇔ λ˜ < a
b
. Which concludes the proof.
3.1 Empathetic Evolutionarily Stable Strategies
Consider a large population of players. Each player has finite set of actions.
Denote by ra(m) := r(a,m) the payoff function of a generic player with action a
when facing a population distribution of actions as m. In the context of pairwise
interaction, this is re-interpreted as acting with another player with strategy m.
When Player 1 plays a mixed strategy x, the expected payoff of Player 1 is
〈x, r(m)〉 where r(m) = (ra(m))a. In the presence of empathy, the payoff is
rΛa (m).
3.1.1 Homogeneous population
We consider an homogeneous population of players. That is, λii = σ for all i
and λij = µ for all i 6= j. The empathy structure is
(
σ µ
µ σ
)
. At each time
step, two players are randomly selected for a 2×2 game. The empathetic payoffs
of Player 1 is given by
AΛ =
(
(λ11 + λ12)a11 λ11a12 + λ12a21
λ11a21 + λ12a12 (λ11 + λ12)a22
)
=
(
(σ + µ)a11 σa12 + µa21
σa21 + µa12 (σ + µ)a22
)
,
=:
(
aΛ11 a
Λ
12
aΛ21 a
Λ
22
)
,
and the payoff of Player 2 is the transpose of the payoff of Player 1.There is a
constraint for each player Cm ≤ V where C = (c1, c2), V ∈ R, (m1,m2) ∈ ∆1,
∆1 = {(y, 1− y) | 0 ≤ y ≤ 1}. Denote by
C := {y | C
(
y
1− y
)
≤ V }.
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The set of constrained best responses to any opponent strategy m ∈ C is
CBR(m) = arg max
x∈C
(x, 1− x)A
(
m
1−m
)
.
If c1 = c2 the constraint is independent of the strategies. Therefore, we assume
that c1 6= c2. We assume that C is non-empty. Denote α = V−c2c1−c2 . Denote by
β1 = (λ11 +λ12)a11− (λ11a21 +λ12a12), β2 = (λ11 +λ12)a22− (λ11a12 +λ12a21).
We transform the matrix AΛ to the following matrix:
A¯Λ =
(
β1 0
0 β2
)
.
The next result shows that the two matrix games A¯Λ and AΛ have the same
Nash equilibrium properties.
Proposition 6. The two matrix games
AΛ =
(
aΛ11 a
Λ
12
aΛ21 a
Λ
22
)
and A¯Λ =
(
aΛ11 − aΛ21 0
0 aΛ22 − aΛ12,
)
,
have the same Nash equilibrium properties in symmetric strategies.
Proof. We compute the set of the possible Nash equilibria of AΛ in symmetric
strategies. Let the population profile be (x, 1 − x) with 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. The pure
strategy x = 1 is an equilibrium if aΛ11 ≥ aΛ21 i.e., β1 := aΛ11 − aΛ21 ≥ 0. The
pure strategy x = 0 is an equilibrium if aΛ22 ≥ aΛ12 i.e., β2 := aΛ22 − aΛ12 ≥ 0. An
interior equilibrium (whenever it exists) is obtained if the indifference condition
is fulfilled.
aΛ11x+ a
Λ
12(1− x) = aΛ21x+ aΛ22(1− x), (1)
(aΛ11 − aΛ21)x = (aΛ22 − aΛ12)(1− x), (2)
β1x = β2(1− x) (3)
x =
β2
β1 + β2
. (4)
It turns out that the symmetric equilibria are all obtained by comparing β1 ≥ 0,
β2 ≥ 0 or ( β2β1+β2 ,
β1
β1+β2
). Thus, it has the same equilibrium structure as in the
diagonal matrix A¯Λ =
(
β1 0
0 β2
)
. This completes the proof.
Notice that the matrix A may not be symmetric. Note that if both β1 and
β2 are zero, the transformed payoffs are constant (degenerate case) and hence,
any strategy in C is an equilibrium. None of these equilibria is resilient by small
proportion of deviants. Thus, there is no constrained ESS in this case.
Proposition 7. Any generic empathetic 2 × 2 matrix game (with non-trivial
payoffs) has at least one constrained ESS.
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Below we prove this statement. By generically, we mean that β1β2 6= 0. We
distinguish two cases depending on the coefficient c1 and c2.
• Let c1 > c2. If V > c1, then C = [0, 1] (unconstraint case, there is an ESS).
If V ≤ c1, then C = [0, α] ⊂ [0, 1].
• Let c1 < c2. If V < c1, C = ∅ (excluded by hypothesis). If V ≥ c1,
C = [α, 1].
We then have to examine two types of constraints:
Type I: c1 > c2, V < c1, C = [0, α],
Type II: c1 < c2, V > c1, C = [α, 1]
3.1.2 Type I
• Consider the following setup:
A¯Λ =
(
β1 0
0 β2
)
, β1 > 0, β2 ≤ 0, C = [0, α].
The first strategy dominates the second one in the unconstrained game.
Hence, the mixed strategy m = α is the unique ESS in the constrained
game. Note that m = α is not an ESS in the unconstrained game.
•
A¯Λ =
(
β1 0
0 β2
)
, β1 ≤ 0, β2 > 0, C = [0, α].
The second strategy dominates the first one in the unconstrained game.
Hence, the strategy mixed strategy m = 0 is the unique ESS in the con-
strained game. This situation belongs to the class of prisoner’s Dilemma
games.
• We now swap the sign of β with
A¯Λ =
(
β1 0
0 β2
)
, β1 > 0, β2 > 0, C = [0, α].
This situation belongs to the the class of Coordination Games. The first
pure action is being eliminated by the constraint, the second strategy is
the unique ESS.
• We now look when both β1 and β2 are negative:
A¯Λ =
(
β1 0
0 β2
)
, β1 < 0, β2 < 0, C = [0, α].
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This situation belongs to the class of Hawk-Dove games. If β2β1+β2 ≥ α
then ( β2β1+β2 ,
β1
β1+β2
) is an ESS; else if β2β1+β2 > α then the constrained best
response set is
CBR(m) = arg max
x∈C
(x, 1− x)AΛ
(
m
1−m
)
=

α if m < β2β1+β2 ,
0 if m > β2β1+β2 ,
C if m = β2β1+β2 .
Thus, CBR(α) = {α} and α is a constrained ESS.
3.1.3 Type II
If α > 1, the interval [α, 1] is empty. We now suppose that V > c1 and α < 1.
• A¯Λ =
(
β1 0
0 β2
)
, β1 > 0, β2 ≤ 0, C = [α, 1]. The first strategy m = 1 is
the unique ESS in the constrained game.
• A¯Λ =
(
β1 0
0 β2
)
, β1 ≤ 0, β2 > 0, C = [α, 1] the strategy mixed strategy
m = α is the unique constrained ESS.
• A¯Λ =
(
β1 0
0 β2
)
, β1 > 0, β2 > 0, C = [α, 1]. The second strategy m = 0
does not satisfy the constraint. The first strategy is a constrained ESS.
• A¯Λ =
(
β1 0
0 β2
)
, β1 < 0, β2 < 0, C = [0, α]. The mixed strategy
min
(
β2
β1+β2
, α
)
is a constrained ESS.
3.1.4 Heterogeneous population
Consider a population game characterized by a payoff function:
ri(., .) : Ai ×
∏
j
P(Aj)→ R,
where Ai is finite (and non-empty) and P(Ai) is the space of probability mea-
sures over Ai. The probability vector mi ∈ P(Ai) represents the aggrega-
tive population state of i, i.e., the fraction of players per action at popula-
tion i. We denote the payoff function a generic player of subpopulation i as
ri(a,m) =: ria(m). Collecting together one obtains a vector payoff function
r(m) = (ria(m))i,ai∈Ai . The empathetic payoff function vector is r
Λ. A Nash
equilibrium of the empathetic game is a population profile m∗ that satisfies the
following variational inequality: for every i,
〈m∗ −m, rΛ(m∗)〉 ≥ 0, ∀ mi ∈ P(Ai).
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Assuming that for every action ai ∈ Ai, the function m 7−→ rΛi (a,m) =: rΛia(m),
is continuous, one can easily show that the population game has at least one
Nash equilibrium. The proof uses a direct application of Brouwer fixed-point
theorem and is therefore omitted.
3.2 Empathetic Learning
We introduce a way of revising the actions of a player from subpopulation
p called ”revision protocol” as ηpab(m, r
Λ(m)) ≥ 0 which represents the rate
of switching from action a to b when the entire population profile is m. A
population profile together with a learning rule (revision protocol) and a learning
rate sequence λˆ defines a discrete-time game dynamics Lη, given by,
mpa,t+1 = m
p
a,t
+ λˆt
∑
b∈Ap m
p
b,tη
p
ba(mt, r
Λ(mt))
−λˆtmpa,t
∑
b∈Ap η
p
ab(mt, r
Λ(mt)),
ma,0 ≥ 0,
∑
a∈Ap ma,0 = 1,
(5)
where λˆt ≥ 0 is the learning rate sequence. Note that the learning dynamics is
well-defined for arbitrary learning rate λˆt ≥ 0.
In view of (5), the first term describes the population state at the previous
time-step, the second term represents the inflow into the action a from other
actions, whereas the third term provides the outflow from action a to other
actions. The difference between these last two terms is the change in the use
of action a, that added to the original proportion provides us with the new
proportion of use of action a. We now check that (5) is well-defined over the
simplex P(A). The lemma below states that if the starting point is inside the
domain P(A) then the dynamics will remain inside P(A) : the dynamics is
forward invariant.
Lemma 1. For a well-designed learning rates λˆt, The simplex P(A) is forward
invariant under (5), i.e., if initially m0 ∈ P(A) then for every t ≥ 0, the
solution of (5), mt ∈ P(A).
Proposition 8. If the empathetic game belongs to the class of coordination,
anticoordination or prisoner’s dilemma, there is a convergence to the set of
pure equilibria under Brown-von Neumann-Nash (BNN), Smith and replicator
dynamics.
The proof is immediate as illustrated. For two actions per player, the het-
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erogeneous game dynamics yields
m11,t+1 = m
1
1,t
+ λˆt(1−m11,t)η121
−λˆtm11,tη112,
m21,t+1 = m
2
1,t
+ λˆt(1−m21,t)η221
−λˆtm21,tη212,
m11,0 ∈ [0, 1], m21,0 ∈ [0, 1].
(6)
The behavior under these dynamics are illustrated in Figures 3, 4, 5. In
addition, the homogeneous population dynamics converges to the unique ESS
in anticoordination games. It remains to analyze the class of matching pennies
games. In the matching pennies we find that even if the game has a unique
mixed strategy equilibrium, the equilibrium point may be unstable in the sense
that for any initial condition (other than that equilibrium point), the system
never converges to the equilibrium point. One innovative result is that, thanks
to empathy, this instability can be broken when both players are empathetic
with opposite signs.
Proposition 9. Under specific empathy matrix Λ matching pennies game can
be tranformed to a coordination game. Therefore, empathy can be used in order
to breaking the instability of the matching pennies game.
Proof. Let the non-empathetic matching pennies game be a11 > a21, a22 > a12
while b11 < b12, b21 > b22. Let λ11 > 0, λ12 < 0 while λ22 < 0, λ21 > 0. Then,
Then the following inequalities hold:
aλ11 := λ11a11 + λ12b11 > a
λ
21 := λ11a21 + λ12b21.
and bλ11 := λ22b11 +λ21a11 is greater than b
λ
12 := λ22b12 +λ21a12. It is turns out
the pure (1, 1) becomes a strict Nash equilibrium in the empathetic game with
λ11 > 0, λ12 < 0, λ22 < 0, λ21 > 0. This stabilizes the empathetic evolutionary
dynamics to a new equilibrium.
The payoff matrix of matching pennies game with the following empathy
structure λ11 > 0, λ12 < 0, λ22 < 0, λ21 > 0 leads to a coordination game (see
Table 3). Hence this leads to two stable pure equilibria at the corner (1, 1) and
(0, 0) as displayed in Figure 3.
Figure 7 illustrates cycling behavior in two-population matching pennies
game under replicator dynamics with starting point (0.4, 0.6), (0.6, 0.4) and
Λ = I. Figure 8 illustrates an elimination of limit cycle in an empathetic two-
population matching pennies game with empathy structure under replicator
dynamics with starting point (0.55, .45), (0.65, 0.35) by changing the empathy
structure to be Λ =
(
1 0.0001
0.0001 −1
)
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I
L R
II
U (λ11 − λ12,−λ22 + λ21) (−λ11 + λ12, λ22 − λ21)
D (−λ11 + λ12, λ22 − λ21) (λ11 − λ12,−λ22 + λ21)
Table 3: The payoff bimatrix of matching pennies game with empathy λ11 >
0, λ12 < 0, λ22 < 0, λ21 > 0 leads to anticoordination game. Hence two stable
pure equilibria
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Figure 7: Cycling in two-population matching pennies game under replicator
dynamics.
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Figure 8: Elimination of limit cycle in an empathetic two-population matching
pennies game under replicator dynamics.
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Proposition 10. In games with a dominant strategy, the involvement of pos-
itive empathy may permit the survival of the dominant strategy. Moreover, the
presence of the non-neutral empathy may change the equilibrium structure.
As a corollary, cooperative behaviors can be observed even in one-shot pris-
oner’s dilemma games (and hence breaking the dilemma). As illustrated in the
diagram of Figure 9, all kind of equilibria are possible in the empathetic game
depending on the values of λ12 and λ21.
Figure 9: Different equilibrium outcomes in the empathetic game. Survival of
the (initially) dominated strategy
4 Mutual support and Berge solution
The Berge solution concept was introduced in [8, page 20]. See also [9, 10, 11,
12, 13, 14, 15] for recent investigation of Berge solution. The strategy profile a∗
is a Berge solution if
ri(a
∗) = max
a−i
ri(a
∗
i , a−i).
Berge strategy yields the best payoffs to the others’ players who also play Berge
strategies. If the players have chosen a strategy profile that forms a Berge
solution, and i sticks to the chosen strategy but some of the other players change
their strategies, then i’s payoff will not increase. This is a resilience to (single
or joint) deviation by other players or other teams.
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Proposition 11. In the prisoner’s dilemma game, the strategy profile (1, 1) is
the unique Berge solution.
Proof. By definition of prisoner’s dilemma game, one has the following inequal-
ities: a12 < a22 < a11 < a21, and b21 < b22 < b11 < b12. In particular a11 > a12
and b11 > b21. This means (1, 1) is a Berge solution. It is easy to check that
there is no other Berge solution in the prisoner’s dilemma game.
This result is important because the outcome (1, 1) appears as a mutual
support between the relay nodes. Note that such an outcome is not possible in
the Nash prisoner’s dilemma game. The Nash equilibria is not able to predict
observed outcomes in practice in the unmodified game while the Berge solution
is predicting a better outcome as (1, 1) is observed in many experimental setups
even in the one-shot game case. Berge solution occurs when players are mutually
supportive in the prisoner’s dilemma game. It means that Player 1 supports
Player 2 and Player 2 supports Player 1. The next proposition establishes a
connection between positive partial mutual altruism and Berge solution in 2×2
games with dominant strategy
Proposition 12. Positive partial mutual altruism leads to the Berge solution
in the prisoner’s dilemma game.
Proof. Let λ12 and λ21 be both positive and of high level. The Nash outcomes
of the empathetic prisoner’s dilemma game are summarized in Table 4.
Player 1 \ Player 2 λ21 Negative Low Medium High
λ12 High 12 12 1 1 11
λ12 Medium 22 22 11,22, x 1+(1-x)2 11
λ12 Low 22 22 22 21
λ12 Negative 22 22 22 21
Table 4: Summary of the outcomes. When λ12 and λ21 are both positive and of
high level, the Nash equilibria of the empathetic game coincides with the Berge
solution (1, 1).
It follows that when λ12 and λ21 are both positive and of high level, the
Nash equilibria of the empathetic game coincides with the Berge solution (1, 1).
This completes the proof.
5 Inconsistency of empathy structure
In this section we examine the consistency of some empathy profiles at different
level of reasoning. The 1-level game is the one obtained by applying the matrix
Λ to the payoff vector r =
(
r1
r2
)
= rI . Thus,
rΛ,1 = rΛ = (rΛ1 , r
Λ
2 ) = Λr, r
Λ,0 := r,
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At the k−th level of empathy the game payoff vector becomes
rΛ,k = ΛrΛ,k−1 = Λkr.
Definition 1. The empathy structure is consistent if the equilibrium structure
of k−th level game is unchanged for any k ≥ 1.
Example 1 (Consistent empathy profile). The identity matrix
(
1 0
0 1
)
is a
consistent empathy structure.
Example 2 (Consistent empathy profile). Let ρ > 0, and Λ = ρ2
(
1 1
1 1
)
.
Then for any k ≥ 1, Λk = ρk−1Λ. It turns out the payoff vector at the k−th
level empathetic game is
rΛ,k = Λkr = ρk−1Λr.
Since ρk−1 > 0 the k−level empathy game is strategically equivalent to the
1−level empathy game. This means that ρ2
(
1 1
1 1
)
is consistent for ρ > 0,
i.e. in the partially equally altruism case.
Example 3 (Inconsistent empathy profile). Let ρ < 0, and Λ = ρ2
(
1 1
1 1
)
.
Then for any k ≥ 1, Λk = ρk−1Λ. It turns out the payoff vector at the (2k+1)-th
level empathetic game is
rΛ,2k+1 = Λ2k+1r = ρ2kΛr.
Since ρ2k > 0 the (2k + 1)-level empathy game is strategically equivalent to the
1−level empathy game. This means that ρ2
(
1 1
1 1
)
However ρ2k+1 < 0 the 2k-level empathy game may not be strategically equiv-
alent to the 1−level empathy game. This means that ρ2
(
1 1
1 1
)
is INconsistent
for ρ < 0 and r = rI non-trivial vectorial function.
Proposition 13 (Sufficient condition for consistence). If there exists a positive
sequence k > 0 such that Λ
k = kΛ then the empathy structure Λ is consistent.
Proof. The proof is immediate. Let k > 0 and the matrix Λ satisfying the
relation Λk = kΛ. This means that the payoff vector of the k-th level game
is rΛ,k = kΛr. Since k > 0 the k−th level empathy game is strategically
equivalent to the 1−level empathy game for any k ≥ 1.
Proposition 14. The empathy structures(
λ11 λ12
λ12 λ22
)
21
such that {
λii root of x
2 − x+ y = 0,
λ12λ21 = y,
are solutions of the system Λ2 = Λ,  > 0. These solutions are consistent
empathy profiles.
Proof.(
λ11 λ12
λ21 λ22
)
.
(
λ11 λ12
λ21 λ22
)
=
(
λ211 + λ12λ21 λ12(λ11 + λ22)
λ21(λ11 + λ22) λ
2
22 + λ12λ21
)
The matrix equation Λ2 = Λ becomes
λ211 + λ12λ21 = λ11,
λ12(λ11 + λ22) = λ12,
λ21(λ11 + λ22) = λ21,
λ222 + λ12λ21 = λ22.
By choosing λ12λ21 = y one obtains
λ12λ21 = y,
λ211 + y = λ11,
λ12(λ11 + λ22) = λ12,
λ21(λ11 + λ22) = λ21,
λ222 + y = λ22.
which completes the proof.
Notice that for x = 2 = λij , y = x
2, the empathy matrix Λ = 2
(
1 1
1 1
)
is a solution to the system of Proposition 14. Similarly, x =  = λii, y = 0 and
Λ = 
(
1 0
0 1
)
= I, is a solution to the system of Proposition 14.
5.1 Infinite hierarchy
We now examine the limit of the matrix Λk as k grows without bound. As we
have seen above Λk may not converge in general. If the maximum modulus of
the eigenvalues satisfy ρ(Λ) < 1, then Λk goes to
(
0 0
0 0
)
as k goes to infinity.
Thus, the infinite hierarchy empathy game becomes a trivial one in this case.
If limk Λ
k = Λ∞ and the infinite hierarchy of empathy game payoff vector is
Λ∞r. The equilibrium structure of the game Λ∞r may be different than the
equilibrium structure of the finite hierarchy of empathy with payoff vector Λkr.
Proposition 15 (Infinitely Consistent Empathy Profiles). The only empathy
profiles in a generic 2× 2 empathetic bimatrix game which are infinitely consis-
tent are I and and
(
λ11
λ11(1−λ11)
λ21
λ21 1− λ11
)
for (λ11, λ21) ∈ R2.
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Proof. If the empathy matrix Λ is diagonalizable but has a single eigenvalue, it
must be I. If Λ is diagonalizable and has two eigenvalues, they must be 1 and
0. There is a basis of matrix P such that Λ = PDP−1 with D =
(
1 0
0 0
)
.
So,
Λ2 = PD2P−1 = PDP−1 = Λ
Since the eigenvalues are
tr(Λ)
2
±
√
tr(Λ)2
4
− detΛ,
it implies that trΛ = 1 and detΛ = 0. So given λ11 and λ21, row 1 must be a
multiple of row 2 by λ11λ21 .
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6 Conclusion
We have presented novel methods that incorporate users’ empathy in 2 × 2
matrix games. We have examined both empathy and antipathy, selfishness and
selflessness in one single unified framework. We observed that empathy plays a
crucial role in these games. It supports cooperation if the empathies signs are
aligned with the payoffs signs. It helps in breaking limit cycling by adopting
different empathy structure. It allows the survival of dominates strategies. It is
shown that a wide range of empathetic evolutionary game dynamics converges
to the set of ESS in non-trivial 2× 2 games. However, number of issues remain
to be solved. Beyond these promising preliminary results, we aim to examine
outcomes and limitations for larger class of games such as mean-field-type games.
We have seen that more fairness and less inequity outcomes are possible thanks
to the presence of partial altruism, empathy-cooperation and mutual support.
Thus, the fairness can evolve, if for some reason a proportion of the population
employs empathy. The method above has a disadvantage. It does not explain
the evolution of empathy such as perspective taking, empathic concern, fantasy
scale, personal distress and involvement scale. Empirical evidence suggests that
these scales are not complete and the empathy state of a player can evolve over
time.
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